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AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF 




In this paper we estimate a pricing equation using data, at route and airline levels, for five 
European countries where a significant proportion of the territory is located on islands; 
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. By using two complementary empirical strategies, 
instrumental variables and matching procedures, we find that the imposition of Public 
Service Obligations does not seem to be effective in reducing prices. Furthermore, we find 
that prices are higher on routes where only island residents enjoy subsidies, but not on 
routes where subsidies do not discriminate between residents and non-residents. Finally, 
prices seem to be higher on routes with flat rates in contrast to routes where subsidies to 
residents are made through fare discounts. Overall, the results of our analysis suggest the 
need to change policies in order to support air services to islands and to avoid distortions 
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The link between air transportation and regional economic growth is well established in the 
literature. In this regard, several studies have shown a strong relationship between air traffic 
and different measures of urban or regional economic performance (Brueckner, 2003; 
Green, 2007; Bel and Fageda, 2008; Percoco, 2010; Sheard, 2014; Bilotkach, 2015; Albalate 
and Fageda, 2016; Fageda, forthcoming). 
The role of air transportation in supporting the mobility of people is particularly 
relevant on islands where surface transportation is only available within the islands, and 
maritime transportation is only a reasonable choice for short-haul distances (usually on 
trips between islands). Furthermore, governments may be interested in protecting air 
services to islands to spur tourism or promote national cohesion (Williams, 2010). 
Hence, governments in European countries where a significant part of the territory is 
located on islands have implemented policies to subsidize air services on domestic routes 
from the islands to the mainland (or viceversa). This is the case of France on routes to 
Corsica, Greece on routes from the main cities to several small islands, Italy on routes to 
Sardinia, Sicily and Lampedusa, Portugal on routes to Madeira and Azores and Spain on 
routes to the Canary and Balearic Islands. 
These policies may be associated with the imposition of Public Service Obligations 
(PSO) where governments set restrictions on entry, prices and frequencies, and grant 
subsidies through a competitive tender to an airline that meet these requirements. 
Furthermore, governments may provide subsidies only to residents on islands by imposing 
a flat rate on the prices that they must pay or establishing discounts that are computed as a 
percentage of market fares. These subsidies to residents may be embedded in the PSO or 
may be separate to it. In this regard, France and Italy have imposed PSO on several routes 
and these PSO include in some cases subsidies to residents in the form of flat rates. In 
Greece, some routes are subject to PSO but residents do not enjoy subsidies from them. 
Finally, Portugal and Spain specifically subsidize island residents on routes to the mainland 
without imposing PSO through discounts on market fares. 
This paper draws on route-level fares for domestic links from the mainland to the 
islands for these five countries. With these data, we exploit the variability in the policies 
implemented in those countries to examine their impact on market fares. Our interest here 
is to examine the effectiveness of PSO that are associated with a price-cap and whether we 
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can find differences between routes with subsidies that do not discriminate between 
residents and non-residents and routes with subsidies only to residents. 
In this regard, several studies have analyzed the design and effects of the PSO applied in 
different European countries. Williams and Pagliari (2004), Williams (2010), Merkert and 
O’Fee (2013) and Wittman et al. (2016) show the high heterogeneity in the PSO programs 
across various European countries. Such heterogeneity includes the criteria for defining an 
eligible route or the determination of service levels, fares and subsidies. 
 Other studies analyze the execution of the program in specific countries. Lian (2010) 
and Lian and Ronnevik (2011) assess the weaknesses of the PSO regulation implemented in 
Norway. In particular, they show that competition is weak and there is a high variation in 
the fares and subsidies per passenger. Di Francesco and Pagliari (2012) analyze the 
potential negative impact on airfares of eliminating PSOs on the routes connecting the 
Italian mainland to the island of Sardinia. Calzada and Fageda (2012) find that prices on 
routes subject to PSO are lower than on unprotected routes with similar characteristics. 
Finally, Angelopoulos et al. (2013) find inconsistencies in the designation of PSO routes 
and the average amount of subsidies per passenger on Greek routes. 
Studies also include econometric analysis with cross-country datasets. Calzada and 
Fageda (2014), for example, find that PSOs reduce competition on protected routes, while 
their effect on the number of flights differs depending on national regulations. Santana 
(2009) finds that PSOs increase the operation costs of European carriers, but she does not 
observe a similar effect in the US system. Merkert and Williams (2013) show that European 
operators perform better in the early months of the PSO contracts than when the contract 
is approaching termination, suggesting that airlines have fewer incentives to increase 
efficiency before the tender finishes due to the absence of competition. Finally, some other 
papers have examined the design of PSOs in European air markets. Pita et al. (2013) 
propose an operational planning model to examine the design of subsidized air 
transportation, and apply this methodology to assess the Azores PSO system; while Pita et 
al. (2014) extended this model and apply it to an analysis of the PSO network in Norway. 
Regarding discounts to residents, econometric studies have focused on the case of 
Spain. Calzada and Fageda (2012) show that routes benefiting from price discounts are 
priced more highly than the remainder of the domestic routes. Fageda et al. (2012) draws on 
data of routes departing from Gran Canaria airport, including national and international 
destinations. They compare prices on subsidized routes (domestic flights from Gran 
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Canaria) with those that are unsubsidized (international flights from Gran Canaria), and 
find that non-resident passengers pay higher prices than international passengers. Fageda et 
al. (2016) did not find changes in fares following an increase in the percentage of discounts 
for residents of market fares. 
Valido et al. (2014) compare the different effects of ad-valorem and specific subsidies for 
resident passengers in air transport markets in a 'market power context'. They show that 
non-resident passengers may be expelled from the market if the proportion of resident 
passengers is high enough. They also analyze the most desirable situation between both 
types of subsidies, ad-valorem or specific, showing that their effects depend on the 
passengers' willingness to pay. Next, they apply the model to the Canary Island markets, 
concluding that the ad-valorem subsidy is not the best for the conditions of this market. 
Finally, Cabrera et al. (2011) carry out a comparative description of these kinds of subsidies 
in Europe's outermost regions (they also analyzed PSO declarations in these regions). 
This paper contributes to the literature on PSO and subsidies to residents by examining 
the impact on prices of the different policies applied in European countries with islands. 
We draw on a large sample of domestic routes that link the mainland with islands for the 
winter and summer seasons of 2016 to estimate a pricing equation that controls for 
different factors, capacity on the route, distance, competition or the presence of low-cost 
airlines. Furthermore, we apply two different estimation strategies. First, we use an 
instrumental variables procedure that takes into account the potential endogeneity of the 
variable for the size of the route. Second, we use a matching procedure with data at the 
route-airline level that focuses on observations that have similar observed attributes. 
We find that PSO do not seem to be effective in reducing prices in comparison to 
routes that are operated on a free subsidy basis. Furthermore, we find that prices are higher 
on routes where only island residents enjoy subsidies but not on routes where subsidies do 
not discriminate between residents and non-residents. Finally, prices seem to be higher on 
routes with flat rates in contrast to the routes where subsidies to residents are made 
through discounts of market fares. 
In the following section, we provide some details on the policies applied in European 
countries to ensure air services to islands. Next, we explain the data used, and some 
descriptive statistics are given. In the last section, the empirical strategy is developed and 
the results of the econometric analysis are explained. Finally, the paper concludes with 
some policy recommendations. 
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2. Subsidy scheme in Europe 
From the period of airline liberalization to date there have been many cases of PSO 
implemented in Europe. However, each country's government has applied this policy in 
different ways “In order to maintain appropriate scheduled air services on routes which are 
vital for the economic development of the region they serve…”1 
The legislation that allows member states to impose PSO on air transport markets is 
Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 
September of 2008, on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community 
(CEC, 2008). This legislation was modified by the Council Regulation (ECC) No 2408/92 
of 23 July 1992, on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes (CEC, 
1992).2 From the first declaration until now (the very first tenders were issued in the Irish 
Republic), the number of declarations have been multiplied: in 1994 there were 64 routes 
(Williams and Pagliari, 2004) but at December 2015, the number of PSO declarations were 
for 238 routes (CEC 2015). 
PSO declaration can include a different number of mechanisms in order to guarantee the 
aforementioned objective. For example, a specific timetable, frequency floors, a minimum 
seating capacity or even price caps. Table 1 shows the list of European Union countries 
with PSO declarations (2015). 
                                                 
1 Extracted from the European Commission webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/internal-
market/public-service-obligations-psos_en 




Table 1. PSO declaration in European Union (air transport) 
Country 




Number of routes 
under PSO 
declarations 
Croatia 10 Italy 22 
Cyprus 1 Norway 51 
Estonia 4 Portugal 21 
Finland 3 Spain 18 
France 45 Sweden 10 
Greece 28 United Kingdom 22 
Ireland 3   
Source: CEC 2015 
 
Apart from this mechanism, transport authorities also employ subsidies that are given to 
resident passengers who are entitled to them because of their resident condition (they 
could be included in the PSO or not). These types of subsidies are applied in France, Italy, 
Scotland, Spain and Portugal. 
Taking this into account, we focus on domestic routes between an island with 
significant tourist flows and a large or medium-sized city from the mainland of five 
European countries: France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Hence, we may distinguish 
between routes subject to PSO obligations and/or price discounts and routes served on a 
free subsidy basis. Tables A1 to A5 in the appendix provides the list of considered routes in 
our sample, specifying whether they are affected by subsidies and/or PSO or not.  
In routes of our sample where PSO obligations have been imposed, price caps and 
frequency floors are always in force. Furthermore, capacity, the operation period, and the 
scheduling (to allow travelers to make a round trip within the same day) are also usually 
required. 
In Spain, there are 18 routes with Public Service Obligation, 13 between the Canary 
Islands, three between the Balearic Islands, one on the Menorca-Madrid route and one 
between Almeria-Seville. Apart from this, in Spain there are routes where passengers enjoy 
resident subsidies, i.e. subsidies given to passengers for resident condition on the Canary 
Islands, Balearic Islands or the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. These subsidies are 
not included in the PSO impositions and they imply a 50% price discount in domestic 
flights. In our study, all Spanish routes enjoy resident discount, but none of these have 
PSO declarations (we only have routes that connect the mainland with islands, and they do 
not have PSO declaration).  
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The remaining countries in our study apply PSO and/or subsidies of some kind. 
Portugal has a similar situation as Spain, i.e., routes with resident discount but no PSO 
declaration. Currently, there are 21 routes with Public Service Obligations that link the 
mainland with the islands of Azores and Madeira or inter-island links. Flat fares are 
established for residents in the Azores (and students) on domestic flights to Madeira or the 
mainland. Hence, they enjoy subsidies for the difference between the market price and the 
flat rate. Note that in Portugal discounts have been separate from PSO contracts since 
2015. 
France has declared a large number and variety of routes with PSO obligations: from 
routes that connected the mainland with their outermost territory (French Guiana), to 
another island (Corsica) or even international links (Amsterdam, Madrid or Prague). 
Specifically, the number of protected routes is 45. Our database includes routes without 
PSO nor resident discount and routes with both PSO and resident discount. Moreover, the 
resident discount through a flat rate is inside the PSO declaration.  
In contrast, Greek routes have PSO declarations or not, but none has resident discount 
(only maximum prices for every passenger, resident or not). PSO declarations here have 
been imposed on 28 routes including routes connecting the main cities in the mainland 
(and Rhodes) to small islands, and intra-island routes.  
Finally, Italy is a different case. There are 22 routes from the main cities in the mainland 
to the islands with a PSO declaration. Routes with PSO to Sardinia has resident discount 
included but there are various ways to make the application. There is a flat rate for 
Sardinian residents. Moreover, this flat rate is different depending on the period of the 
year: from 16th September to 14th August there is a flat rate for all passengers, resident or 
not. The rest of the year there is a discount only for resident passengers. Hence, this 
periodic change in public aid allows us to control for potential different effects on prices. 
In the next section we elaborate on the data used to compare differences in prices 
between routes with resident subsidies and/or PSO declarations and unprotected routes, 
and compare price differences between routes with subsidies to all passengers or only for 
resident passengers. Note here that this enables us to identify differences between 




Our unbalanced database includes 187 routes across two seasons in 2016 (339 pairs route-
season) from different European national routes between an island and the mainland.3 We 
distinguish between routes with PSO declarations and/or subsidies given to passengers 
because of their resident condition, and routes without PSO nor subsidies. Route fixed 
effects cannot be included as the degrees of freedom in the estimation would be too low. 
This is a limitation of our data that must be taken into account. 
 
Table 2. Airlines-routes and season with PSO and subsidies in the database. All 
routes have an island as endpoint 
 Routes Routes with PSO 
Routes with 
resident discount 
Spain 234 0 234 
France 67 24 24 
Italy 159 30 18 
Portugal 20 0 20 




515 58 272 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Table 2 includes the number of observations (airlines operating by routes and season). 
Regarding air routes specifically, the control group in our database is composed of air 
routes in Italy (63%), France (22%) and Greece (15%). Regarding the treatment group, our 
database includes routes from Spain (75%), Italy (10%), France (8%), Portugal (6%) and 
Greece (1%). 
This structure of the data will allow us to use an empirical strategy based on how the 
treated routes fares (i.e. those that are subsidized and/or with PSO declaration) are in 
relation to the control group (those routes unaffected by subsidies or PSO). We also 
distinguish between two seasons (winter and summer), so any observation is identified by 
route (i) and season (s). 
The variables included in the database are: 
                                                 
3 Please see the Appendix for the list of routes included in the sample. 
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1. LnPriceis: is the natural logarithm of the price corresponding to route i and season s. This 
is the dependent variable in our model. This variable is constructed as the lowest mean 
round trip price charged by airlines offering services weighted by their corresponding 
market share. Information has been obtained manually from airlines' websites for a sample 
week of the summer and winter season in 2016. 
We follow these homogeneous rules in the data collection of prices. Price data refer to 
the city pair link that has as its origin the mainland and destination on an island. 
Additionally, it has been collected one month before travelling, the price refers to the first 
trip of the week, and the return is the last trip of the week. With this procedure, we can 
exploit the variability of data across routes because we obtain data in homogeneous 
conditions for all the routes in our sample. Note that we do not have information about 
the proportion of business and leisure travelers for the routes under consideration. 
However, as we mention above, all considered routes are domestic links between an island 
with significant tourist flows and a large or medium-sized city from the mainland. Thus, we 
can expect that the proportion of business/leisure travelers is similar.4 
To explain the corresponding price for each route we take as explanatory variables the 
following:  
2. LnSeatsis: is the natural logarithm of the seats corresponding to route i and season s in the 
month of travel (March or July). Data are drawn from RDC aviation (Innovata Data).  
This variable may be showing an endogenous relationship with the explained variable, 
so we have implemented instrumental variables in the estimation of equation [1] through 
the following variable as instrument: the logarithm of the average population between 
origin and destination (NUTS 3 regions) of route i in 2015, using data from Eurostat. 
We have also run regressions using as additional instruments the logarithm of the 
average arrivals at tourist accommodation establishments between origin and destination, 
and the logarithm of the average gross domestic product (GDP) per inhabitant at current 
                                                 
4 Having said this, the lack of information about the proportion of business/leisure travelers is a potential 
shortcoming of our data to take into account in the interpretation of results. In this regard, we could assume 
that some routes in the treatment group have lower participation of business travelers. If we do not match 
those routes with control routes that have similar participation of last-minute business travelers, then the 
average price of those routes may be lower than other routes simply because on those routes prices increase 
quickly only a few days before departure. In other words, leisure-related routes may be relatively more 
expensive than business-related routes if we collect fare data one month before travelling. If treatment routes 




market prices. However, these additional instruments do not pass the test of over-
identifying restrictions. 
3. Ln HHI seatsit: logarithm of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index on route i, which is defined 
as the sum of the squares of the market shares of airlines operating the route through 
number of seats offered by airlines. Data are drawn from RDC aviation (Innovata Data). 
The maximum value of the index is 1 (that corresponds to a monopoly, i.e., the greater the 
index the lower the level of competition) and this index is a standard way to measure the 
level of concentration in a determined market. In the case that competition reduces prices 
charged by airlines, the sign of the coefficient associated to this variable should be negative. 
However, this variable may also work as a proxy for the profitability of operating on the 
route as it may be correlated with the levels of demand on the route or omitted factors that 
influence such profitability. 
4. Low Costi: binary variable that takes value 1 if a low-cost airline operates a route i. A 
negative sign is expected for the coefficient associated with this variable. These kinds of 
airlines usually fix very low charges, thus inducing other route competitors to reduce prices. 
Indeed, the downward pricing pressure that low-cost airlines exert on the routes they 
operate is well documented in the literature (e.g., Morrison, 2001; Goolsbee and Syverson, 
2008; Hofer et al., 2008; Oliveira and Huse, 2009). 
5. Ln distancei: logarithm of the number of kilometers between origin and destination of the 
route i. Route length is a major determinant of airline costs and its coefficient is expected 
to be positive and lower than one. This means that the increase in costs is less than 
proportional to the increase in the number of kilometers flown. Long-haul routes involve 
higher average speeds, less intense consumption of fuel, and lower airport charges per 
kilometer. Data for this variable are also drawn from RDC aviation (Innovata Data).  
6. Season: binary variable that takes value 0 in winter season and 1 in summer season for 
route i. Its coefficient is expected to be positive because of the high demand in this period. 
7. Seven variables are included in order to control the effect of the varying policies applied 
by different countries. Route with aid Spain and Route with aid Portugal take value 1 if the route 
is subsidized. Route with aid Greece takes value 1 if the route is under PSO obligation. Route 
with aid France and Route with aid Italy take value 1 if the route is under PSO obligation jointly 
with subsidies. 
Moreover, in Model 2 we divided the Italian variable into two: Italy all (that takes value 1 
if the route is under discount for every passenger) and Italy only resident (that takes value 1 if 
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the route is under discount only for resident passengers). These variables show us the 
relative change of these treated routes in relation to the control group (routes without 
subsidies or PSO declarations). Moreover they also show the differences between countries 
and hence between different policies. 
Firstly, discounts given to island residents may have different effects on prices (without 
discounts). On the one hand, the discount should increase the amount of traffic on the 
route (by residents). Second, these discounts make the demand of island residents less 
elastic and, as a consequence, airlines can set higher mark-ups, so they may increase prices 
(Calzada and Fageda, 2012). On the other hand, airlines may be forced to incorporate the 
subsidy to the price (without discount) if they are operating in a competitive context. 
Indeed, the subsidy may increase the number of airlines offering flights in the route given 
the increased demand. This effect can be in part captured by the variable of concentration 
on the route (the HHI index). Overall, the subsidy may have an effect both on demand and 
supply, so that the expected effect on airlines behavior is not clear a priori. 
Following Fageda et al. (2016), there is an effect that only could be captured through 
variables that distinguish between residents and non-residents, but unfortunately this 
information is unavailable. We have to take into account that on subsidized routes there are 
two types of passengers with varying willingness to pay, so regardless of the impact of 
discounts on demand and supply, prices could be lower with the discounts. As the discount 
only affects one of the two types of passengers (the island's residents) resident demand 
increases but at the expense of the non-resident passengers that can be expelled from the 
market. This may lead to lower demand and prices. However, the comparison between 
subsidized and non-subsidized routes may indirectly capture such an effect. 
In any case, as we mention above, previous studies for Spain suggest that prices on 
routes subject to resident discounts may be higher (Calzada and Fageda, 2012; Fageda et al., 
2012).  
Secondly, the effects of PSO declaration are not so clear, because there are different 
types of regulation depending on the declaration, so predicting the effects is not a 
straightforward exercise. However, the objective of PSO policies is to prevent prices on 
protected routes being higher than those on unprotected routes. Hence, the sign and 
statistical significance of the PSO variables may provide evidence about the effectiveness of 
these policies. In this regard, Calzada and Fageda (2012) provide evidence for Spain in 
favor of the hypothesis that PSO declarations have reduced prices in relation to 
unprotected routes.  
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Table 3 includes some descriptive statistics and a T-test of the database at route level. 
We split each data on both subsidized (treated) and non-subsidized routes (control group). 
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Weighted price 131.29 127.32 102.82 72.31 -3.97 -0.4782 
Weighted price 
per km 
0.18 0.19 0.21 0.13 0.016 0.9429 
Seats 7656 8182 10013 10035 525.29 0.5813 
HHI (seats)  0.56 0.80 0.24 0.23 0.2450 11.5124*** 
Average 
population (*) 
1730160  1055916 1030734 682571 -674244 -8.2195*** 
Distance 1123.68 692.69 663.96 255.95 -430.99 -8.8155*** 
Season 0.54 0.56 - - - - 
Lowcost  0.59 0.81 - - 0.23 5.6425*** 
Source: own elaboration. Note: Route with= route with some public aid; Route without= route 
with any public aid. (***) T-test between two groups shows statistical significance. 
 
All average values for the variables included in the database show statistical differences 
using the T-student test of means, excepting those related to prices (weighted price and 
weighted price per kilometer) and seats. Thus we have to control all covariates 
simultaneously in order to test whether prices are different on both routes (with and 
without public aid). 
Our empirical strategy is based on the implementation of two complementary 
techniques: an instrumental variables procedure and a matching analysis. The instrumental 
variable procedure allows us to control for the bias related with the simultaneous 
determination of the dependent variable and endogenous explanatory variables. A key issue 
here is to find appropriate instruments that meet the exogeneity and strength conditions. In 
our context, the potential endogenous explanatory variable is the variable of seats, which is 
a control variable (not the treatment variable), and population of route endpoints, which 
seems to work well as an instrument.  
The main disadvantage of the instrumental variables procedure is that it may not control 
appropriately for pre-existing differences between treatment and control routes. This is the 
main advantage of the matching analysis. The disadvantage of the matching analysis is that 
it implies working with a reduced sample (treated and control routes with comparable 
characteristics) so that the number of observations is lower than in the analysis with 
instrumental variables. Another limitation of the matching estimator is that it relies on an 
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assumption of conditional independence of potential outcomes and treatment assignment 
given observables. This implies that selection into treatment is driven solely by factors 
observable by the researcher (see Heckman et al, 1997). This is the main reason that it is a 
complementary analysis to the previous instrumental variable estimations. 
4. Instrumental variables estimation 
As we mentioned above, we first implement an Instrumental Variables procedure to 
analyze the effects of each type of subsidy program on prices.  
We implement an Instrumental Variables estimator because there may be a 
simultaneous determination of prices and seats, as we previously mentioned. This strategy 
requires the use of instruments that must be correlated with the instrumented variable and 
which should not be endogenous. In this regard, we include the following variable as an 
instrument; the mean population of both endpoints of the route. Our empirical analysis is 
based on the estimation of the following pricing equation for the route I in season s: 
LnPriceis  0  1LnSeatsis  2LnHHIseatsis  3Routewithaid _ Italyis 
4Routewithaid _ Francei  5Routewithaid _Greecei 
6Routewithaid _ Spaini  7Routewithaid _ Portugali 
8LnDistancei  9Seasons  10Lowcosti  is
 
[1] 
We estimate two models. The first is precisely the previous equation. The second splits 
routes with aid in Italy into two different variables: Itally_All, that takes value 1 if it is a 
route where public aid is granted for all fliers; and Italy_Only residents, a binary variable that 
take value 1 if the route received public aid only for residents. These two variables control 
for potential divergence in prices by airlines depending on which passengers benefit from 
public aid.  
Note that we have run regressions including country-specific effects separately from the 
policy variables. However, multicollinearity prevents us from identifying the effect on 
prices of each of the considered countries. Results of this regression are similar to those for 
the regression that do not include separate country dummies. However, we have preferred 
to report just the regression without the country binary variables as we cannot identify the 
effect for all countries. 
Table 4 shows the results of both estimations. 
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Table 4. Price equation using panel data estimations with instrumental variables 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 
Ln seats -0.02 (0.04) -0.003 (0.05) 
Ln HHI seats 0.97 (0.07)*** 0.97 (0.07)*** 
Route with aid_Italy 0.17 (0.08)**  
Italy_All  -0.13 (0.16) 
Italy_Only residents  0.21 (0.09)** 
Route with aid_France 0.55 (0.07)*** 0.54 (0.08)*** 
Route with aid_Greece 0.06 (0.15) 0.05 (0.15) 
Route with aid_Spain 0.20 (0.07)** 0.21 (0.07)*** 
Route with aid_Portugal 0.55 (0.11)*** 0.54 (0.11)*** 
Ln distance -0.62 (0.05)*** -0.62 (0.05)*** 
Season 0.23 (0.03)*** 0.22 (0.04)*** 
Low Cost -0.33 (0.08)*** -0.34 (0.08)*** 
Constant 2.84 (0.62)*** 2.75 (0.65)*** 
Observations 337 337 
R2 0.78 0.77 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors among brackets. 
Note 2: Seats have been estimated using the following instrument: mean population of 
both endpoints of the route. 
 
The overall explanatory power is high (R2=0.78). Note that the instrument passes the 
under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics); the test reports 28.901*** in 
model 1 and 23.565*** respectively in model 2. It also passes the weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic); the test reports 79.72*** in model 1 and 63.30*** in 
model 2. Moreover we implement the Breusch-Pagan test and it indicates that linear forms 
of heteroskedasticity are not present and therefore standard errors are not biased. 
However, errors are robust to heterokedasticity (robust option by Stata is used). 
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Results for the control variables confirm the a priori expectations. In this regard, we find 
some evidence that airlines may exploit density economics on denser routes. Indeed, the 
coefficient associated with the variable for the number of seats (which is a proxy of the 
demand on the route) is negative. However, it is not statistically significant so that density 
economies in our sample seem to play a modest role. Furthermore, the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index positively affects prices. This outcome implies that the weaker the 
competition on the route, the higher the price. Another expected result is that the presence 
of low-cost airlines leads to lower prices, as the dummy variable that identifies it is negative 
and statistically significant. 
We also confirm the existence of strong distance economies; the coefficient of the 
distance variable is negative and lower than one. Finally, prices are higher in the summer 
season, which may be interpreted as a greater willingness of travelers to pay in the summer 
or higher load factors. Recall that routes in our sample include islands with significant 
flows of tourists, so that it may be expected that demand is higher in the summer. 
Regarding the policy variables, we do not find evidence that routes with price caps have 
lower prices than on the other routes. In fact, in our sample, routes with public aid in 
France and Italy have higher prices than in the control group routes. Recall that these routes 
are subject to PSO that put limits on the maximum prices that airlines may charge. Only in 
the case of Greece is it found that prices on routes with public aid do not seem to differ to 
those charged on other routes. Note that the magnitude of the coefficients in Spain, where 
routes with public aid are not restricted by PSO, is even lower than in France and similar 
than in Italy. 
We also find that prices are substantially higher on routes affected by resident discounts. 
Indeed, the coefficient of the variables that identify routes with public aid in France, 
Portugal and Spain are positive and statistically significant. This is also the case on Italian 
routes where only residents enjoy flat rates (see coefficient of the variable Italy_Only 
residents). In contrast, we do not find a clear impact on the market prices of subsidies that 
affect all travelers regardless of whether they are residents or not on islands. In this regard, 
the coefficient of the variable for protected routes in Greece is not statistically significant 
while the coefficient of the variable for protected routes in Italy where subsidies do not 




We also find some evidence that flat rates tend to lead to higher prices than discounts 
over market fares. In this regard, the magnitude of the coefficient is much higher for 
France and Portugal (which apply flat rates) in relation to Spain (which applies discounts). 
However, differences between Italy (that apply flat rates) and Spain are minimal.  
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5. Matching analysis 
In this section, we estimate the effect of public aid on prices using matching techniques. 
Academic literature has been referred to as unconfoundedness, exogeneity, ignorability or 
selection on observables when regression models have been used. However comparisons 
made between treated and control groups remove any self-selection bias. Adjusting 
treatments and control groups for differences in covariates, or pretreatment variables, is the 
key to obtaining the causal inference of effects, as matching analysis seeks to do (see Rubin, 
1974 or Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Let Y1 represent the outcome (here, price and price per kilometre set by an airline) in the 
case of a unit (a route) exposed to treatment (some public aid). By analogy, Y0 is the 
outcome if the unit is not exposed to treatment (D=0). 
Our interest is defined by the difference between Y1 and Y0. In our specific case, we are 
interested in estimating the average effect on prices per kilometre set by airlines of routes 
affected by public aid, which can be defined as: 
E Y1 Y0 D  1  
A set of observable characteristics (Z) affects both treatment status and potential 
outcomes. Using the conditional independence assumption and a requirement for 
identification, the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (hereafter, ATT) can be 
identified as:  
ATT  E Y1 Y0 D  1  E E Y1 Y0 D  1,Z  
 E E Y1 D  1,Z  E Y0 D  0,Z D  1 
 
In this case, our unit of observation is the pair airline-route (instead of the route, as in 
previous estimations we have made). For this reason, the use of matching estimator pairs 
up treatment routes (airlines on routes WITH some public aid) with control routes (airlines 
on routes WITHOUT public aid) that have similar observed attributes. This is one of the 
main advantages of this matching analysis in contrast to the former empirical approach. 
We estimate the effect of the treated routes on endogenous variable (prices) based on all 
explanatory observables using a sub-sample where control routes have similar 
characteristics to treated routes. Hence, the matching analysis controls for pre-existing 
differences between treated and control routes. In this case, the explanatory variables used 
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were: distance, season, low-cost binary variable, average population and the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index on seats. 
The main issue here is whether differences in pre-existing characteristics of treated and 
control routes may distort our results. In order to work with a sample with comparable 
treated and control routes, we have calculated the average treatment effect on the treated 
routes by using the Kernel Matching method.5 The estimation has been done using the 
bootstrap option and 1,000 repetitions. 
Table 5 summarizes the matching estimator outcome. We consider two general 
differentiations: firstly, routes with discounts to residents versus the control group. And 
secondly, routes with aid to all passengers (residents and no-residents) versus the control 
group. 
Moreover, we also estimate by considering all sample, and a subsample of the data that 
only include firms that operate in both treated and control group routes. The latter seeks to 
control for potential variations in behaviour of these firms between these two routes. 
                                                 
5 Four of the most widely matching methods are the Nearest Neighbor, Radius, Stratification and Kernel. 
None of these are a priori superior to the others. See Becker and Ichino (2002) for a further explanation. 
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Table 5. ATT estimation on prices per km. Kernel Matching. Bootstrapped standard errors. 
Note 1: ** 5%, *** 1% significance test. T-test in brackets. 
Note 2: Covariates used were: distance, season, low-cost binary variable, average population 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index on seats. 
 
Matching estimations yield to a general outcome: a scheme that affects only residents 
has a positive effect on prices and prices per km, while those schemes that do not 
discriminate among consumers do not change those prices, because they (matchings 
included in row 5 to 7) do not show statistically significant differences between the 
treatment and control group, and also between the sample and the subsample. 
In fact, using both the average price and price per kilometre these results imply that they 
are on routes with aid to residents close to 38 and 12 per cent higher than on control group 
routes (see different outcomes depending sample and prices considered). 
As we have mentioned above, results for the other routes (those that consider all fliers) 
are not statistically significant. The difference on outcomes between the two kinds of route 




In this paper, we have estimated a pricing equation to identify the effects on prices of 
different policies applied in five European countries on domestic routes that link the 
mainland with islands. 
Results of our analysis provide some evidence that PSO policies are not effective in 
containing prices, which means that the established price cap does not seem to be lower 
than airlines would fix in a free market context. Note here that PSO usually implies limiting 
entry on the route to the airline that meets the service levels and fares imposed in the 
declaration. Furthermore, regional airlines are usually those that win the tender. In this 
regard, low-cost airlines are able to operate with lower costs than regional airlines, 
especially when routes are not very short.  
Furthermore, we find that routes subject to price discounts to residents increase market 
prices so that some cross-subsidization from residents to non-residents seems to take place. 
In this context, note that most of these routes are highly dependent on tourism, so that 
higher prices for non-residents could have a negative effective on the economic activity of 
the islands. 
To this point, our data have some limitations as we only have available information for 
two seasons so that route fixed effects cannot be considered and we only have one 
instrument for the potential endogenous explanatory variable. Hence, further research with 
a full panel data set and more instruments may be needed to confirm the results of this 
paper. 
In any case, our analysis draws into question the suitability of these policies. Regarding 
this point, it is important to mention that many of the routes affected by subsidies are high 
density routes. This is especially the case in France, Italy and Spain. On these dense routes, 
airlines may be able to offer services with a reasonable service and affordable prices 
without the need for subsidies. For this reason low-cost airlines have concentrated a 
significant part of their business on tourist routes. 
Alternative policies that could be applied to ensure air services in domestic routes that 
link islands with the mainland are to provide funds for investments in airports or active 
competition policies that avoid the exploitation of market power in routes where 
alternative transportation modes are not an option. These policies have the advantage that 
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Table A1: List of routes included in the sample (France) 
Routes without subsidy/PSO Routes with subsidy and/or PSO 
Bordeaux   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro   Marseille   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro   
Bordeaux   Bastia - Poretta   Marseille   Bastia - Poretta   
Bordeaux   Figari - Sud Corse   Marseille   Figari - Sud Corse   
Brest Bretagne   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro   Nice - Cote D'Azur   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro   
Brest Bretagne   Bastia - Poretta   Nice - Cote D'Azur   Bastia - Poretta   
Caen - Carpiquet   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro   Nice - Cote D'Azur   Figari - Sud Corse   
Caen - Carpiquet   Bastia - Poretta   Paris - Orly Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro   
Lille   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro   Paris - Orly Bastia - Poretta   
Lille   Bastia - Poretta   Paris - Orly Figari - Sud Corse   
Lille   Figari - Sud Corse     
Lyon - Saint Exupery   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro     
Lyon - Saint Exupery   Bastia - Poretta     
Montpellier - Mediterranee   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro     
Nantes Atlantique   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro     
Nantes Atlantique   Bastia - Poretta     
Nantes Atlantique   Figari - Sud Corse     
Paris - Beauvais-Tille   Figari - Sud Corse     
Paris - Charles De Gaulle   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro     
Paris - Charles De Gaulle   Bastia - Poretta     
Paris - Charles De Gaulle   Figari - Sud Corse     
Toulouse - Blagnac   Ajaccio - Campo dell'Oro     
Toulouse - Blagnac   Bastia - Poretta     
Toulouse - Blagnac   Figari - Sud Corse     
 
 
Table A2: List of routes included in the sample (Greece) 
Routes without subsidy/PSO Routes with subsidy and/or PSO 
Alexandroupolis - 
Demokritos   
Sitia   
Athens - Eleftherios 
Venizelos 
International   
Karpathos   
Athens - Eleftherios 
Venizelos International   
Chania International   
Athens - Eleftherios 
Venizelos 
International   
Sitia   
Athens - Eleftherios 
Venizelos International   
Heraklion - N. 
Kazantzakis   
Thessaloniki 
International   
Kerkyra - I. Kapodistrias   
Athens - Eleftherios 
Venizelos International   
Kerkyra - I. Kapodistrias     
Athens - Eleftherios 
Venizelos International   
Mikonos     
Athens - Eleftherios 
Venizelos International   
Diagoras   
Preveza - Aktion   Kerkyra - I. Kapodistrias     
Preveza - Aktion   Sitia     
Thessaloniki International   Chania International     
Thessaloniki International   
Heraklion - N. 
Kazantzakis   
  






Table A3: List of routes included in the sample (Italy) 
Routes without subsidy/PSO Routes with subsidy and/or PSO 
Ancona - Falconara Catania - Fontanarossa 
Bologna - Guglielmo 
Marconi 
Cagliari - Elmas 
Ancona - Falconara Trapani - Birgi 
Bologna - Guglielmo 
Marconi 
Olbia - Costa 
Smeralda 
Bari - Palese Cagliari - Elmas Milan - Linate Alghero - Fertilia 
Bari - Palese Catania - Fontanarossa Milan - Linate Cagliari - Elmas 
Bari - Palese Palermo - Punta Raisi Milan - Linate 
Olbia - Costa 
Smeralda 
Bologna - Guglielmo Marconi Alghero - Fertilia Naples Cagliari - Elmas 
Bologna - Guglielmo Marconi Catania - Fontanarossa Rome - Fiumicino Alghero - Fertilia 
Bologna - Guglielmo Marconi Palermo - Punta Raisi Rome - Fiumicino Cagliari - Elmas 
Bologna - Guglielmo Marconi Trapani - Birgi Rome - Fiumicino 
Olbia - Costa 
Smeralda 
Cuneo - Levaldigi Cagliari - Elmas Turin - Caselle Cagliari - Elmas 
Cuneo - Levaldigi Trapani - Birgi Verona Cagliari - Elmas 
Florence - Peretola Catania - Fontanarossa   
Florence - Peretola Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Genoa - Cristoforo Colombo Catania - Fontanarossa   
Genoa - Cristoforo Colombo Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Genoa - Cristoforo Colombo Trapani - Birgi   
Milan - Linate Catania - Fontanarossa   
Milan - Linate Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Milan - Malpensa Alghero - Fertilia   
Milan - Malpensa Cagliari - Elmas   
Milan - Malpensa Catania - Fontanarossa   
Milan - Malpensa Olbia - Costa Smeralda   
Milan - Malpensa Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Milan - Orio Al Serio Alghero - Fertilia   
Milan - Orio Al Serio Cagliari - Elmas   
Milan - Orio Al Serio Catania - Fontanarossa   
Milan - Orio Al Serio Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Milan - Orio Al Serio Trapani - Birgi   
Milan - Parma Cagliari - Elmas   
Milan - Parma Trapani - Birgi   
Naples Catania - Fontanarossa   
Naples Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Perugia - Sant Egidio Trapani - Birgi   
Pisa - Galileo Galilei Alghero - Fertilia   
Pisa - Galileo Galilei Cagliari - Elmas   
Pisa - Galileo Galilei Catania - Fontanarossa   
Pisa - Galileo Galilei Olbia - Costa Smeralda   
Pisa - Galileo Galilei Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Pisa - Galileo Galilei Trapani - Birgi   
Rome - Ciampino Cagliari - Elmas   
Rome - Fiumicino Catania - Fontanarossa   
Rome - Fiumicino Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Rome - Fiumicino Trapani - Birgi   
Trieste Trapani - Birgi   
Turin - Caselle Catania - Fontanarossa   
Turin - Caselle Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Turin - Caselle Trapani - Birgi   
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Venice - Marco Polo Cagliari - Elmas   
Venice - Marco Polo Catania - Fontanarossa   
Venice - Marco Polo Olbia - Costa Smeralda   
Venice - Marco Polo Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Venice - Treviso Cagliari - Elmas   
Venice - Treviso Catania - Fontanarossa   
Venice - Treviso Palermo - Punta Raisi   
Venice - Treviso Trapani - Birgi   
Verona Catania - Fontanarossa   
Verona Palermo - Punta Raisi   
 
Table A4: List of routes included in the sample (Portugal) 
Routes with subsidy and/or PSO 
Lisbon   Madeira   
Lisbon   Ponta Delgada - João Paulo II   
Porto   Madeira   
Porto   Ponta Delgada - João Paulo II   
 
Table A5: List of routes included in the sample (Spain) 
Routes with subsidy and/or PSO 
A Coruña   Tenerife North   
A Coruña   Gran Canaria 
Alicante   Ibiza   
Alicante   Gran Canaria 
Alicante   Menorca   
Alicante   Palma Mallorca   
Alicante   Tenerife North   
Almeria   Palma Mallorca   
Asturias   Lanzarote   
Asturias   Gran Canaria 
Asturias   Palma Mallorca   
Asturias   Tenerife North   
Barcelona   Fuerteventura   
Barcelona   Ibiza   
Barcelona   Lanzarote   
Barcelona   Gran Canaria 
Barcelona   Menorca   
Barcelona   Palma Mallorca   
Barcelona   La Palma   
Barcelona   Tenerife North   
Barcelona   Tenerife South   
Bilbao   Fuerteventura   
Bilbao   Ibiza   
Bilbao   Lanzarote   
Bilbao   Gran Canaria 
Bilbao   Menorca   
Bilbao   Palma Mallorca   
Bilbao   La Palma   
Bilbao   Tenerife North   
Granada   Palma Mallorca   
Lleida - Alguaire Palma Mallorca   
Madrid - Barajas   Fuerteventura   
Madrid - Barajas   Ibiza   
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Madrid - Barajas   Lanzarote   
Madrid - Barajas   Gran Canaria 
Madrid - Barajas   Palma Mallorca   
Madrid - Barajas   La Palma   
Madrid - Barajas   Tenerife North   
Madrid - Barajas   Tenerife South   
Malaga   Fuerteventura   
Malaga   Ibiza   
Malaga   Lanzarote   
Malaga   Gran Canaria 
Malaga   Palma Mallorca   
Malaga   Tenerife North   
Malaga   Tenerife South   
Santander   Tenerife South   
Santander   Tenerife North   
Santiago De Compostela   Fuerteventura   
Santiago De Compostela   Lanzarote   
Santiago De Compostela   Gran Canaria 
Santiago De Compostela   Palma Mallorca   
Santiago De Compostela   Tenerife North   
Santiago De Compostela   Tenerife South   
Sevilla - San Pablo   Ibiza   
Sevilla - San Pablo   Lanzarote   
Sevilla - San Pablo   Gran Canaria 
Sevilla - San Pablo   Menorca   
Sevilla - San Pablo   Palma Mallorca   
Sevilla - San Pablo   Tenerife North   
Sevilla - San Pablo   Tenerife South   
Valencia   Ibiza   
Valencia   Gran Canaria 
Valencia   Menorca   
Valencia   Palma Mallorca   
Valencia   Tenerife North   
Valencia   Tenerife South   
Vigo   Gran Canaria 
Zaragoza   Palma Mallorca   
 
 
